David I. Mc Williams – Views

 

By meaning – Democracy

This case study will look primarily at the period dating from the inception of the first independence movements at the turn of the 20th century and the formation of the political bodies, which fight for an independent sovereign state today. The aim of this case study is to investigate and compare the political ideologies of national separatist movements within Scotland and Catalonia and the democratic methods or terrorist campaigns used to achieve an independent sovereign state within the United Kingdom and Spain.

This case study will look at the historical context of separatist movements and the aims of the states they wish to form taking into account the roles of national identity, socialisation and sub-governmental departments within their nation states. It will also look at international comparisons and the effects of a Scottish independence referendum on the Catalonian movement. This case study will look at the concepts and theories, which have been applied to the topic as well as the key contributors, and controversies and clashes in the evidence which have arisen, gathered both in the media at home and abroad. It will look at the extent to which the information available is accurate and relevant to the drive for independence.

Data collection and analysis will be collected within a cross-sectional design format, allowing both Scotland and Catalonia to be compared in their campaign for independence.

The History of Democracy in the Basque Country

The Basque region historically has enjoyed a degree of autonomy within the governmental system in Spain. From the fourteenth century they enforced regional laws and through the fuero creating a degree of autonomous rule. From 1939 to 1979 general Francisco Franco exercised “total and repressive control” (Perez-Agote, 2006) of the Basque region in Spain. In 1979 following Franco’s death the Basque Autonomous Community was formed creating a local government structure to carry out government functions as well as its own parliament and police force (Perez-Agote, 2006).

The Partido Nationalista Vasco (PNV) is the oldest political party in the Basque region. The PNV are right-wing Basque nationalists which favours autonomy for the Basque region but opposes violent means of achieving their political aims. In 1959 Euskadi Ta Akatasuna (ETA) was formed by left-wing youths who wished to “promote the establishment of an independent Basque state” (Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal, 2003). The use of kale borroka and terrorism to achieve their goals has been a trait of ETA in the struggle for independence within the region (Paddy Woodworth, 2007) since its formation.

The support for violence as a means of achieving political goals can be explained by the socialisation of the Basque communities, first under Franco and then within the political forum since 1979. Tight social communities within the region allowed the nationalist movement to flourish with the dissemination of values and ideals being propagated within social groups such as drinking groups (poteo), dancing clubs, and informal social circles (cuadrillas)(Perez-Agote, 2006). The organisation of political groups under Franco and these networks were utilised in the political struggle for independence.

The most important element of social cohesion both during Franco’s reign and post 1979 was the emphasis on the lingua franca of the Basque region (Euskara). Prior to the civil war Euskara was the dominant language in the region but during Franco’s reign he “decreed that Euskara was not to be used and took measures to repress it” (Perez-Agote, 2006), this had the effect of solidifying the Basque belief that their language was a key element in sustaining their heritage and traditions. During this time there was a clandestine effort within the Basque community to teach Euskara and secret Euskara schools (ikastolas) were established, “the more the repression, the more the Basques used their own language” (Perez-Agote, 2006).

Among ETA activists there is a view that the creation of an autonomous government has not achieved the desired level of political and cultural autonomy, which the independence movement had desired. The view is that since the departure of Franco and the lessening of subjugation by the central government the fight for independence has lost its edge. It could be argued that the creation of a Basque government has had the effect of diluting the will of the people, seeing political struggle taking on a more traditional form and the social groups, which were underground, now returned to their traditional purposes and no longer geared towards political struggle.

The drive for independence post Franco saw the traditional political parties taking the stage in Spanish politics. The PNV were criticised for their abandonment of political struggle and accused of settling for the level of autonomy which the central government provided, which saw the rise of left-wing nationalist parties continuing with the attitude that was born in oppression.

The break down of Basque solidarity post Franco allowed for the first time a democratic political system which in theory would allow differences to be set aside and the strengthening of the autonomous Basque community. This has not manifested itself and there are still those who do not fully accept the current political framework.

TABLE – Preferences concerning the form of the state among Basque (1998) and Spanish (1996) respondents

Basques% (1998) Spaniards% (1996)

Centralism 4 16

Regional Autonomy 37 44

Federalism 25 21

Independence 25 8

DK/NA 9 11

N = 1,600 2,500

Sources: EUSKOBAROMETRO (1998) and CIS, No. 2,228 (1996)

Following the inaugural election of 1977 and the autonomy referendum of 1979 Basque politics have been concerned with the politics of both state and sub-state nationalism. The complex scenario in Spain sees the breakdown of political parties at both the national and regional level with goals and objectives being taken into account by the volume and varying ideologies, which converge on the political forum. The duel aims of nationalism within Spain sees unionists such as the Partido Popular (PP) and Unidad Alavesa (UA) having right-wing ideology but championing differing forms of unity such as provincial and national. Left-wing unionists such as the Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSE), Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE), and the Izquierda Unida (IU-PCE from 1980) have therefore forged specific ideological stances and developed alliances, which strengthen their position within the state system.

Following the first Basque regional legislature the Basque nationalist party’s (PNV) core values evolved following divisions within the party between 1984 and 1986 culminating in the split of 86. Today the PNV is still the main Basque nationalist party, which is “conceptualised no longer in terms of race or religion, but rather of language and residence”(Jan Mansvelt Beck, 2010). Although the PNV’s core values have changed there is still a radical nationalist element within the party that still wishes to achieve full independence from the Spanish state. The divisions within the PNV still cause friction with regards to moderate and radical nationalist objectives and strategies.

TABLE – Subjective National Identification of Basque Natives and Immigrants (1998)

Natives% Immigrants%* Total%

Spanish only 1.9 15.1 7.1

More Spanish than Basque 1.4 13.3 6.0

Basque and Spanish 24.8 44.7 32.9

More Basque than Spanish 27.9 14.0 22.3

Basque only 36.0 4.5 23.4

DK/NA 8.0 8.4 8.3

N= 839 550 1,389

Source: Francisco J. Llera (EUSKOBAROMETRO)

*Including children of immigrants

Terrorism As a Means of Achieving Political Goals

During the democratic transition in Spain (1975-82) Herri Batasuana (United Nation) emerged as the political wing of ETA. “At its creation ETA ‘was only theoretically dedicated to an armed struggle” (Jan Mansvelt Beck, 2010) wishing to change the existing political structure. ETA is rooted in Basque nationalism referring to nationalist ideals and symbols such as “references to glorious battles, brave nationals, martyrs or violent rebellions” (Jan Mansvelt Beck, 2010) against a common enemy.

ETA’s radical nationalist campaign “with all the forms of public dissent denied to them, secrecy, activism and exile bred a violence fondatrice among Basques, which served as the foundation for the development of a subculture of violence in their society”(Francisco J. Llera, 1999). The dichotomisation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and the process of social development in the Basque country post 1940 invariably created the violent conflict between Euskadi and the Spanish state, which was engrained in the radical nationalists fight against the elite within the Spanish society.

Between the period 1978-80 ETAs campaign of terrorism and violence was responsible for 31% of all assassinations and 41% of all kidnappings (Francisco J. Llera, 1999) and during its thirty year history “ETA has been responsible for almost 800 assassinations, over 60 kidnappings, and more than 1000 injuries (Francisco J. Llera, 1999). ETAs destabilising strategy is based on terrorism as a means of projecting power supported by the MLNV (Basque National Movement of Liberation), claiming responsibility for “more than 80 per cent of all people killed in terrorist or police actions in Spain during the last 30 years”(Francisco J. Llera, 1999) and accounting for 60% of all police and military fatalities (Francisco J. Llera, 1999).

TABLE – ETA’s Terrorist Activity 1968 – 1997

Deaths:

Basque country 523

Rest of Spain 236

Percentage in the Basque country 68.91

Deaths per million inhabitants per year:

Basque country 8.17

Rest of Spain 0.22

Ratio Basque country/rest of Spain 37.43

Notes: Authors’ computations (F.J.Leira) from Fundacion BBV (1999) and Spanish Ministry of Interior (2002).

The targets of ETA reflect that of the IRA in that they actively pursue police and military as they class these as enemies of the Basque country and view them as occupying their land in there “war of the Basque people against the Spanish state and capitalism”(Francisco J. Llera, 1999). This violent struggle sees industrialists and politicians being targeted in order to weaken the state and instil fear in the Basque industrialists. Opposition terrorism in the Basque country is a means of forcing a new political understanding between two conflicting views of the state. It is interesting to note the similarities between ETA and the IRA both in the aims of the political movement and the methods employed to achieve their goals.

The similarities between Basque nationalists in Spain and republicans in Ireland are substantial. In both instances there is a historical basis for secession and a deep-rooted commitment to culture, community and the family unit. Without support from family members as well as the community at large the struggle in both Catalonia and Northern Ireland for a sovereign state would not be able to justify violent activism. It is the local support and network, which enables and encourages the terrorist means of achieving their goal.

The national objective now showed comparisons of international struggle and a political voice for the extreme nationalists. “Many Basque youngsters now prefer to be active in apolitical groups rather than in politicised groups”(Jan Mansvelt Beck, 2010) as in Spain, radicalised nationals “reject any participation in the new institutions as a betrayal of the Basque cause and reject the Spanish constitution of 1978”(Francisco J. Llera, 1999).

The region of Catalonia has witnessed terrible violence and oppression prior to the 1978 constitution and as such developed its values and institutions out with the democratic political framework. In Spain and in particular Catalonia, the formation of a government which entered democratic politics was not in touch with the methods of interaction as well as the role of state institutions. Mirroring the IRA in Ireland prominent members of ETA recognised the need for political negotiation but in 2002 and 2003 under PP and the PSE, Batasuna was declared illegal and ETA stepped up its campaign of terror “picking of soft targets like journalists, local politicians, and judges, especially but not only in the Basque country” (Paddy Woodworth, 2007). During the March 2009 regional elections with Batasuna and other political wings of ETA banned saw the decline in political support for an independent state through democratic means. After the Madrid bombings of 2006 and the end of the ceasefire “many of ETAs demoralised political supporters are no longer comfortable with civilian casualties under any circumstances”(Paddy Woodworth, 2007)

By 2009 the tide had shifted resulting in victory for the PNV showing the right-wing nationalists that democracy could deliver an independent sovereign Basque state. The Spanish reform process finally opened up legitimate political discourse between organisations within the MLNV and the central government in Madrid leading to a legitimisation crisis within ETA.

Democratic Nationalism in Scotland

The formation of the SNP in Scotland in 1934 was based on allowing the people of Scotland a say in the way in which the country was governed in relation to the differing attitudes and needs of the people. The diversity within Scotland, politically, economically and culturally was recognised in regional needs at a local level.

The SNP’s rhetoric was based on the “importance of Scottish self-government rather than a political ideology (Peter Lynch, 2009), this allowed the nationalist branch of the partyi to consolidate their efforts on the question of independence in Scotland.

The period between the 1930s and 1960s saw a new party constitution drafted in 1948 and SNP policy radicalised from 1946. Following the war, the party which had no particular ideology became more left wing in not only its policies, which were not explicitly socialist nor did they contain “free market language or ideas either”(Peter Lynch, 2009). These policies included the fragmentation of power within Scotland and the “decentralisation of industries such as coal” (Peter Lynch, 2009) this allowed the nationalists to control the infrastructure of Scottish regional and local bodies with regards to Scottish issues. This initial diffusion of political power within a democratic system was the basis for the current independence movement today in Scotland.

The period between 1945 and 1962 saw the SNP attempt to break into a two-party state, which was dominated by Labour and the Conservative Scottish Unionists.

TABLE

1945 Labour & Conservative = 88.7%

1950 Labour & Conservative = 91%

1951 Labour & Conservative = 96.5%

1955 Labour & Conservative = 96.8%

1959 Labour & Conservative = 93.8%

As such this was the nationalists opportunity to begin the task of learning to govern and gaining the necessary tools to build an independent Scottish state. This corresponds with the first Basque government in Spain (1979) and allows an insight into how differing paths to independence can be undertaken.

During the 1960s, the SNP, formally a party with no particular political ideology other than independence, embraced social democracy. From the 1960s the SNP championed causes which would make them more electable such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmamentii (Peter Lynch, 2009) Which gained them the social democratic vote as well as the backing of trade unions, this allowed the SNP to gain support from the populist voter. By 1967-68 the SNP sought to formalise its roots with the trade unions in Scotland with the Association of Scottish Nationalist Trade Unionists (Peter Lynch, 2009) cementing their dominance as the workers party in Scotland, a position previously held by Labour.

The emergence of the 79 Groupiii was “the first organised ideological faction within the SNP”(Peter Lynch, 2009) and its prominence within the party in the early 1980s was a clear sign that the left-wing elements of the independence movement were gaining popularity. The stated aims of the 79 Group “were full independence, a Scottish republic and a socialist redistribution of power, income and wealth”(Peter Lynch, 2009). The general shift of the SNP from no ideology other than independence to the new generation, which recognised the democratic system, would enable them to join the political forum and debate independence. This saw the political system within Scotland entertaining left-wing radicalism with the shift in policies from 1969 concerning welfare, community services, minimum wage, equal pay, and union rights.

From the mid 1980s the SNP continued to portray themselves as the party of the working class and following the effects of the poll tax and Thatcherism, the SNP had a new drive for an independent state. Going back to its roots and concentrating on their policy rather than trying to fashion an ideology the party elevated populist policies and elected left-wing Alex Salmond in 1990.

After the dominance of New Labour in the mid 1990s, the SNP shifted policy direction yet again in order to attract the median electorate. Left of centre, social democratic ideologies were resumed in order to gain votes within the centre ground.

The establishment of a Scottish parliament and executive in 1999 and the adoption of the additional member system was, in theory, in place to prohibit any one political party from gaining an overall majority. The SNP victory in 2011 is “the greatest challenge to the British state since Ireland was partitioned in 1921”(David McCrone, 2012). This win was attributed to the SNP being seen as the party most likely to stand up for Scotland.

TABLE – Distribution of seats

SNP LABOUR

CONSTITUENCY 45.4% 31.7%

REGIONAL 44% 26.3%

SEATS 69 37 (out of 129)

TABLE – Share of vote by SNP at United Kingdom general elections and Scottish Parliament elections (percentages)

United Kingdom general Scottish parliament elections UKGE-SPE

1997: 22 1999: 29 -7

2001: 20 2003: 24 -4

2005: 18 2007: 33 -15

2010: 20 2011: 45 -25

In the mid to late 1970s the Labour Party in Scotland recognised “the distinctiveness of Scotland and Wales and has accepted the demand for constitutional change in these areas” (Deacon & Lynch, 1996) and whilst Labour in Scotland “remained committed to devolution after 1979, the Welsh Labour Party dropped its devolution policy after the overwhelming referendum defeat of 1 March 1979” (Deacon & Lynch, 1996).

In the 1970s “not only was Labour a minority government, but a number of its own backbenchers from Scotland, Wales and the North of England were hostile to devolution” (Deacon & Lynch, 1996). TNS Research International record a “drop in support for independence after the 2007 election” (Leith & Steven, 2010) and the YouGov survey “suggests that there were actually higher levels of overall voter satisfaction with the performance of the Scottish Executive in 2007 than in 2003”(Leith & Steven, 2010).

In 2010 “the SNPs core objective is Scotland becoming an independent nation-state within the EU”(Leith & Steven, 2010) and by “promising to give ‘the people of Scotland’ a chance to vote on independence in the 2010 referendum, the SNP was able to say to voters that any fears they had in relation to its core ideology was immaterial at the time of the 2007 election”(Leith & Steven, 2010). This allowed the SNP to project a vision of the future with no ideological substance but did present a nationalist choice for the electorate.

From 2007 the SNP faced issues of credibility within the political scene due to ailing performance and it was the perception that “it was unable to govern, either through lack of experience or lack of any meaningful policies aside from the focus on secessionist nationalism”(Leith & Steven, 2010) and the traditional weakness of the SNP being its lack of substance and the disintegration of core values based on religion, language and ethnicity.

Identity and the Scottish Political Elites

Elites have a significant function in defining and bordering the Scottish nation, and in influencing the sense of Scottishness and Britishness (as well as other forms of identity) held by the masses of Scotland”(Leith, 2012). Research which was presented at Leith and Soule (2011), “which investigated the issue of national identity in Scottish political discourse”(Leith, 2012) and sought to gain “the specific understanding and awareness of the nature of Scottish identity as both understood and held by individual members of the Scottish political elite themselves”(Leith, 2012). This experiment was carried out in the style of Moreno questioning, where questions were structured in order to gage levels of Scottishness compared to Britishness (Leith, 2012).

The decisive factors of identity for the masses are similar, if not identical to those of the political elites. The polarisation within Scotland is such that working class attitudes and those of the political elite are an accurate representation of where each ideology is forged and the goals of those involved – i.e., those who have an active stake in the future of Scotland.

The SNP wants to give the people of Scotland a say in their future. The trouble is that Scotland is now polarised to such a degree that the needs of the people of Scotland are as much class orientated as regionalist. The independence movement must first take into consideration the perspectives of the ‘average Scot’iv at both ends of the scale. Those who direct and enact political policy and those who abide by it may differentiate this.

Although Scotland is meritocratic society nationalism is still deep rooted in its values and beliefs. For example the elites within society still hold traditional conservative liberal democratic values. These values are a result of their socialisation as well as inherent Scottish identity. The socialisation of the political elite within traditional Scottish society has meant that their hopes and dreams for a sovereign Scottish state are markedly different from those who hold a more socialist view.

The working class in Scotland post 1950 was made up of nationalists with a more socialist outlook. An example of this is the conversation between Douglas Alexander and Gerry Hassan – Scotland, nationalism and the left. During this piece Alexander speaks of his hopes for Scotland post-Thatcher being based on the Scottish people carving out a better life for themselves (positive determination). He says that “at the time it felt like a struggle for Scotland’s soul”(Alexander & Hassan), he also speaks of the fact that at the time it was the Labour Party in Scotland which were seen as the best hope for the “possibility of a better Scottish nation”(Alexander & Hassan). The hope was that a “fairer more socially just Scotland could be forged”(Alexander & Hassan). Hassan speaks pragmatically concerning the underlying issues in Scottish society recognising that there is a class divide in Scotland, which is entrenched in our system. His views may represent a scathing critic of our society, but it does emphasise the inequalities within Scotland today (Alexander & Hassan).

Hassan speaks of the politics of division within Scotland and the diversion from the critical issues concerning the people of Scotland versus the national drive. Hassan’s view is that the drive for independence should be concentrating on policies, which affect the social fibre of Scottish citizens. He believes that in the current political scene there is enough “respect and empathy for differing opinions”(Alexander & Hassan), seeing Scottish society and the identity and socialisation of being that of division, and the division of opportunities. This argument could also be reflected in the current SNPs affiliation with business.

As stated previously, the SNPs history shows that it was based independence and not on a commitment to socialist values, and at no time was their any mention of preserving the Scottish culture, or reviving it as the case may be.

In Machiavellian terms, the SNP throughout their history has aligned themselves politically with the intention of fulfilling the party’s need at that specific point in time. In recent times we have seen them back the workers during Thatcher’s reign, aligning themselves with the trade unions and during New Labours dominance in Scotland it was them who paved the way for devolution and not the SNP. It was also the centre-left policies, which attracted the luke warm electorate to the SNP. In short, it is evident that the SNP as a nationalist party is not based on Scottish identity in any historical or cultural sense.

In terms of national identity, Scotland is lacking. One way to understand Scotland’s drive for independence is that it has no national language to speak of, and no great desire to preserve what’s left. Heritage is no longer a justification of territorial dispute and based on these comments it is questionable where an independent Scotland may be heading.

The social indicators, which bind a nation and allow it to exist rather than become fragmented such as culture, language and identity, are weak within contemporary Scotland. “Language is a common element to many nationalist movements throughout the world but it has never been central to Scottish nationalism and a majority of the Scottish nation, remaining a firmly minority language within Scotland”(Leith, 2012). Not only is there a separation of culture and language but the political elite within Scotland may be seen to have differing views as well as perspectives on the direction of Scotland in the future. Evidence from the 2003 Scottish Social Attitude Survey (SSAS) suggested that “it is clear for the majority of the masses, place of birth is central to membership of the Scottish nation”(Leith, 2012) with only 35% disagreeing. It is also clear that while the central question of birth and Scottish citizenship, it is considerably more complex when the idea of identity is continued into citizenship, pensions, services and the other instruments of state.

The elite view of identity within the Scottish political scene is quite different. The working class view on independence is based on a better state, which provides better services and elevated living conditions. The elite view is different because their standard of living is already at peak. This sees the elite perspective on independence being driven not by identity but by business. Increasingly the SNP has become a pro-business party, which backs the projects, which it favours in policy.

The elite view on Scottish national identity therefore reflects that of a global citizen. Although birthright, race, and Scottishness play a major part in their view of Scottish identity the importance of national identity and the role of Scottishness is not importance to the Scottish independence referendum.

TABLE – Elite Analysis

SCOTTISH ONLY 53%

SCOTTISH/BRITISH 31%

BRITISH 7%

These figures show considerable correlation with the Scottish masses but the data (from Leith) is evidence that the question of identity within the Scottish elite is that of the lower classes. Individuals expressed that they were both Scottish and British; the justification for this was based on the grounds that Britain was, as a whole, “cultural, historical and even ethnic in nature”(Leith, 2012). The argument is that there is a British culture and the elite view of Scottishness is similar to that of the SNP, which is that if you ‘work’ for Scotland then you are Scottish. This form of Scottishness is very civic in nature and one interviewee argued that “being Scottish is, ‘a state of mind”(Leith, 2012). All in all, it could be argued that the contemporary movement for independence is based on a business model rather than any radical nationalism. This is evident in the fact that for the Scottish masses place of birth is relevant whereas for the elites this is not the case. (Leith, 2012).

The Democratic Role in State Building

The formation of a Scottish Parliament has allowed for the SNP to take a democratic route towards independence. In 1997 74.3% voted in favour of a Scottish Parliament and 63.5% granted it tax varying powers (Mason, 2006), this is not “ a federal settlement, involving a constitutionally guaranteed division of powers between the central government and the regions”(Goodlad, 2005) as the Sewell convention states that “it will not legislate on devolved subjects without the consent of the Scottish parliament”(Goodlad, 2005).

As these new powers were transferred to the new Scottish institutions the legitimacy of the democratic process has allowed Scottish nationalists to open up new routes of communication within the governmental institutions. The role of democracy in Britain has even allowed for the SNP to be able to introduce change on a democratic level as well as gain support for independence while taking advantage of the experience of government institutions at a state level. The legitimisation of the Scottish government and the democratic path that it followed was in part due to the fact that Scottish politics although advantageous, also recognised the role of government in the drive for an independent state. In contrast to Spain, the SNP in Scotland and the nationalist movement as a whole welcomed the formation of a Scottish political base.

Intergovernmental concordants and joint ministerial committees have facilitated the building of the Scottish system as a mechanism for the flow of information from state to national level. Consultation and cooperation provide the Scottish government with the tools of state needed in order to give fair representation to its citizens. “The Scottish Parliaments select committees are more powerful than their counterparts in London, with an active role in the review of legislation”(Goodlad, 2005), this allows Scotland to meet the specific needs of its citizens and the Scottish Constitutional Convention “also gave civil society a degree of ownership in the new institutions, reflected in the creation of a Civic Forum to interact with the Parliament”(Bort, 2007).

TABLE – Constitutional preferences – %

1996 MAY 1997 SEPT 1997 1999

Independence 28 26 37 27

Scottish parliament

With tax raising power – 42 32 50

Scottish parliament

With no tax raising powers 39 9 9 9

No Scottish parliament 25 17 17 10

(Bort, 2007)

A government closer to the people was envisioned in order to create better housing, better healthcare and improve education, creating jobs (Bort, 2007). The main difference between Scotland and Catalonia is that in Scotland the nationalist movement took the opportunity to become part of the political structure in order to have a say, even if it was a minority position. This allowed them to fight the current system from the inside and alter the course of Scottish politics in the 21st century and gain independence.

CONCLUSION

In Spain the struggle for independence takes a different path than that of the United Kingdom due to the nationalist party in Scotland opting for a more democratic route where it is able to influence the decision making process. In Spain the nationalist parties must also communicate with each other as well as find a balance with Madrid. Various nationalist factions within the Basque country and Spain at large have yet to find popular politics, which appease the struggle between central government and regional autonomy. In Scotland the role of the democratic process has allowed Scottish nationalists to interact and influence government institutions.

Support for terrorism as a means of achieving independence within the Basque country can be attributed to the socialisation of nationalists. From the civil war to the authoritarian regime of Franco there has been an element of violent struggle within the Basque region. The consequences of such conflict have led to nationalists being militaristic in their methods. It could be argued that the bloodshed during the civil war allowed the desensitisation of death and destruction, while the brutal dictatorship of general Franco gave rise to the formation of close-knit groups, which campaigned in secret to avoid persecution from the state. Nationalists were conditioned to use the same means at their disposal as the state used to suppress them.

In Scotland the debate is maybe whether the SNP can still be seen as a nationalist party. Since 2004 Salmond has promoted his drive for independence on the romanticised image of Scotland in order to tap into foreign markets and expand the ‘Scottish brand’ in the global market. In Scotland culture and identity are used to mobilise Scotland in the corporate sense rather than the historical sense. Recently in the build up to the independence referendum SNP policies have centred around seeking support within the business community and a strategy of promoting the Scottish economy around the need for domestic business growth rather than social justice. In the future the debate may be centred on whether the SNP is a social democratic party or a pro-business party.

i The Scottish National Party was formed through the amalgamation of The National Party for Scotland and the Scottish Party (Lynch, 2009).

ii Also cited in (Mitchell, 1996: 208).

iii “The emergence of a younger generation of Socialists who formed the 79 Group and became prominent in the SNP in the early 1980s” (Lynch, 2009).

iv Average wage, children, working hours, level of education ect.

Refrences: 035967

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Declan Mason: Devolution Is It Working?, Politics Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, February 2006, pp. 20-23.

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